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Abstract 
This article considers how an increasingly visible set of mobilities has implications for how 
peace and conflict are imagined and responded to. We are particularly interested in how these 
mobilities take form in everyday actions and shape new forms of peace and challenge 
existing ones. The article considers fixed categories associated with orthodox peace such as 
the international, borders and the state that are predicated on territorialism, centralised 
governance, and static citizenship. The article can be read as a critique of liberal 
peacebuilding and a contribution to current debates on migration, space and the everyday. 
Through conceptual scoping we develop the notion of mobile peace to characterise the fluid 
ways in which is being constructed through the mobilitiy of people and ideas.  
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governance, and static citizenship. The article can be read as a critique of liberal 
peacebuilding and a contribution to current debates on migration, space and the everyday. 
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Introduction 
This article considers how an increasingly visible set of mobilities has implications for peace 
and conflict – core concerns in International Relations and a range of other disciplines 
including Migration Studies and Anthropology. The fixed categories associated with concepts 
such as the international, state, society, peace processes, peacebuilding and statebuilding are 
                                                 
1 Oliver Richmond is a Research Professor in IR, Peace and Conflict Studies at the University 
of Manchester, UK and a Fellow of the Royal Society for the Arts. He is also International 
Professor, College of International Studies, Kyung Hee University, Korea, and Visiting 
Professor at the University of Tromso. His publications include Peace Formation and Post-
Conflict Political Order, (Oxford University Press, 2016), Failed Statebuilding vs Peace 
Formation (Yale University Press, 2014).  He is editor of the Palgrave book series, Rethinking 
Peace and Conflict Studies, and co-editor of the journal, Peacebuilding. 
2 Roger Mac Ginty is Professor at the School of Government and International Affairs, and the 
Durham Global Security Institute, Durham University. He is editor of the Palgrave Macmillan 
book series, Rethinking Political Violence, and co-editor of the journal, Peacebuilding. 
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predicated on territorialism, centralised governance, and static citizenship. The issue of 
migration, in particular, has attracted significant academic attention (Korzeniewicz and 
Albrecht 2015; Ryo 2013; Squire 2016), though we see human migration as just one type of 
mobility that can be placed in a wider context of mobilities and immobilities, as well as 
governance designed to control them. These mobilities are not necessarily new but their 
visibility and configuration challenge assumptions and practices that underpin how 
contemporary conflict, peace, power and agency are understood and practiced. They relate to 
the nature of the states-system and international order, and how we think about peace and 
emancipation.  
The article examines the implications of an emerging set of mobilities and how they shape 
peace. We are particularly interested in the everydayness of mobility and immobility and how 
this patterns peace.  Our contribution largely takes the exploratory form of conceptual 
scoping and draws on an extensive engagement with a wide literature, as well as evidence 
from a number of research projects the authors have been engaged in separately and jointly. 
These include the Everyday Peace Indicators project (everydaypeaceindicators.org) and the 
EUNPACK project that looks at EU crisis mechanisms. The article follows on from work by 
Brigden (2016) on improvised transnationalism and Adamson (2006) and Lazaridis and 
Wadia (2015) on the securitization of migration. It is also mindful of earlier work in IR that 
has tackled globalization and sovereignty (Krasner 2001; Rosenau 2003; Slaughter 2004). 
Our central argument juxtaposes a series of immobilities upon which traditional approaches 
to peace, security, and order rely, with a set of mobilities that challenge them but also offer 
opportunities for new formulations. We realise that a mobility-versus-immobility binary is a 
simplification of dynamic and complex processes, yet we find it a useful way of illustrating 
the inertia of orthodox approaches to peace, security, and order in IR. 
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The local turn in peacebuilding debates (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: Paffenholz 2015) 
continued the process of rethinking the need for structural change in the face of new 
possibilities and agencies being exhibited by populations imprisoned within moribund political 
and epistemological frameworks (their states, political, social or economic systems, for 
example), and yet find ways of acting politically and ethically. It sought to move away from 
levels of analysis debates that reinforced the power of formal institutions, and instead take 
seriously a more networked and scalar form of International Relations (Sasken, 2006: Jessop, 
2016) which engages with relational social claims (Melucci, 1989: Latour 2005: Qin 2016) and 
the claims of the bottom-up and sub-state levels to be seen in their own right (Mac Ginty 2015). 
As this article seeks to show, the capitalist-technological response to the limitations of the 
liberal international architecture and the political violence it either ignored or unleashed is 
making for a much more Orwellian understanding of peace and order in neoliberal terms. 
Digital forms of governmentality operate across global networks, often the very same ones that 
civil society operated transnationally to bypass centralised state or international authorities. 
Tensions between rights and capital, and rights and boundaries, have now been thrown into 
much sharper relief by apparently new mobilities, movements and synergies, and research into 
them (Piketty 2014). Much of this mobile thinking highlights questions of state-centric peace 
processes, justice and equality, historical continuities of power, the limitations of rights and 
norms, hidden racism and eurocentrism, the transmittal of trauma across generations, new 
forms of hegemony and oligarchy, and the critical import of the Anthropocene (Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998: 887-917: Moyn, 2018: 11; Sassen, 2006: 291;  Jessop, 2016: 225; DeGooyer 
(et al) 2018: 4.; Bell, & Pospisil 2017; 576–593; Chandler, 2018; 159). It also points to new 
dynamics, including the rise of the BRICS, the environmental and credit crises, increasingly 
networked capital, the emergence of more new/old wars, greater levels of spatial mobility, 
digital, networked and multiscalar, and nano-technologies, and the troubled attempts towards 
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UN reform or global restructuring. This is indicative of a rupture between traditional ways of 
global political and economic organisation and new demands and pressures (perhaps between 
analogue and digital forms of international relations (Richmond, unpublished).  
We argue that the failed experiments with liberal peacebuilding and neoliberal statebuilding 
of the last 25 years now point to the urgent need to engage with matters identified by critical 
theorists in the past but only partially engaged with, and some newly emerging issues 
(Richmond 2014). These include matters of rights, justice, inequality, capital, identity, trauma 
(Schwab, 2010), and the environment. These matters need to be examined broadly, across 
time and space and in view of increasing levels and types of mobility. This denotes the future 
expansion of temporal and material rights where states or international architectures have 
failed to provide a viable peace so far. A decade and a half into this century narrow 
understandings of liberalism cannot be rescued by a ‘new’ alliance between technology, 
capital and largely unreformed states and international institutions. So far the results are not 
encouraging for conflict-affected populations around the world (nor for populations in the 
west). 
The local, cultural, and practice turns in the literature (Brown 2012; Jackson 2008; Wallis 
2017; Adler-Nissen 2016) gave rise to an investigation of local agency and strategies or 
tactics, but also foreground the dynamic of power relations, and more generally of the 
potential and limits of relational ontologies versus the fixed ontologies of the social, state and 
international architecture exhibited until recently in most literatures connected with peace and 
order. A next stage is to understand agential mobilities (meaning mobile political agency) in 
the context of these power-shaped relational ontologies, once again a shift prefigured by work 
on social mobilisation, critical agency and resistance, civil society, and revolutionary 
movements, often in critical or post-structuralist theory (Campbell, & George, 1990: 269-
293). We are aware that the agency that enacts and embodies the mobilities on view are 
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constrained by structures, polities, traditions and assumptions. It is the complex interaction 
between these structures and the new (or newly visible) mobilities that interests us. 
In terms of structure, the article will first illustrate the emphasis on stasis in traditional 
approaches to making and maintaining peace. A fixed international architecture regards is an 
important site of political rent, positions mobility as a threat, and powerful actors have 
worked hard to limit, deny and ignore various mobilities (with the recent exception being the 
mobility of capital). The section outlines five immobilities that characterise dominant 
approaches to contemporary peacemaking and peacebuilding. The second section will 
examine how newly configured and visible bottom-up mobilities are manifesting themselves 
in relation to peace, conflict, and sovereignty. An important characteristic of many of these 
mobilities is that they ignore the state and international structures, and occur despite them. 
The third section will think through the implications of these mobilities for the meanings and 
practicalities of peace, security, and order. In particular, it will underline how liberal 
internationalism is often (unconsciously) complicit in the development of these new 
vulnerabilities. While there is a growing literature on mobility and its consequences (Sheeler 
and Ury 2006; Lisle 2016), especially in relation to human migration, our chief contribution 
focuses on the implications of mobility and its agential dynamics for peace in the twenty-first 
century. For reasons of space, the article does not focus on the contradictions of liberalism 
within states in the global north, or the implications in relation to migration and mobility. 
This is well covered elsewhere (Adamson et al., 2011: 843-859). We put forward the notion 
of a mobile peace, or ways in which peace is conceived, constructed and operationalized to 
take account of mobility in a networked and digital international environment (Castells 2009: 
44:   David Chandler, 2017: Aradau and Blanke 2015 & 2017). 
.  
Relationality and Mobility under a Fixed International Architecture 
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The principal argument of this article is that contemporary mobilities of capital, people, ideas 
and technology present fundamental challenges to states and international organisations in 
their attempts to maintain a fixed order and their own legitimacy. Crucial in this is the 
‘inequality of mobility’ and sets of perceptions that are linked with this (Wang 2004: 351). 
The fixity of populations within states is a considerable source of power. For many states and 
international organisations, mobility has been prominently connected with discussions of the 
globalisation of violence and the demise of the Weberian state, the weakness of international 
law and enforcement capacity, refugees, migration, and the rise of non-state ‘terrorism’. The 
securitization of the current European ‘migrant crisis’3 is merely the latest example of how 
mobility (of people, ideas etc.) have been characterised as a threat to order and the antithesis 
of peace (see, for example, Lazaridis and Wadia 2015). Except for capital, certain ideas and 
technology, order is found in fixity (e.g. territoriality, institutions, social contract, citizenship 
and rights). States and international organisations have relied on a series of stabilities or 
immobilities (of international boundaries, identity groups and citizenship, institutions, and 
ideology etc.), and control of the means of violence to maintain their positions as leading 
actors in the international system. They have also relied on these stabilities or capacities 
remaining largely unquestioned. Thus, for example, the post-WWII status quo is reflected in 
the permanent membership of the United Nations Security Council, expanded only with new 
non-permanent members. The emphasis on stability was somewhat relaxed after the end of 
the Cold War to allow a greater mobility of people, goods, and services, but largely for 
reasons of profit rather than justice or humanitarianism, within the parameters of liberal and 
neoliberal thought. 
                                                 
3 The authors are aware that the European ‘crisis’ needs to be placed in the contexts of other Middle Eastern and 
African states that are experiencing conditions that prompt displacement and migration, and the fact that many of 
these states host large numbers of displaced or marginalized people.  
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The foundational stabilities of contemporary international order require the citizen to be static 
except perhaps for professional or leisure reasons, in a liberal contractual relationship with 
their sovereign state under the terms of the Montevideo Convention on fixed populations and 
territories (Grant 1999), with a neoliberal relation to capital. This was augmented from the 
early nineteenth century with increasing levels of international and regional institutions and 
organisation, plus international law, in order to control the behaviour of states in a mutual 
manner. Decentralised forms of governance to overcome the legitimacy gap also fixed the 
citizen into increasingly decentralised and parochial spaces. Mobility for reasons of security 
and development were henceforth seen to be the exception, and were temporary, in an 
international system that was increasingly ‘settled’. Where mass migration was sanctioned, 
for example in settlement processes used by China in Tibet or the 1923 Greco-Turkish 
population exchange, it was tightly controlled or incentivised and had the ultimate aim of 
protecting a conservative order or a re-ordering. Free movement schemes between states (for 
example, between selected European Union states or between Canada and the United States) 
only exist because they have been sanctioned by states, and are monitored by them. The 
phrase ‘gated globalism’ captures the managed nature of borders, and how they have been 
recast as sites to be managed (Andrijasevic and Walter 2010). For many people, free mobility 
was impossible as rights were achieved through a contractual relationship with a specific 
liberal state, unless the state broke down and migration became necessary for reasons of war 
or insecurity. The whole notion of the states-system as well as the international architecture is 
based upon assumptions of immobility, which appear to be at odds with questions of 
international justice, cosmopolitan thought, and critical attempts to mediate the boundaries 
that cause enmity in international relations. Global justice requires equal rights across the 
planet (or commons), and distributive and historical justice point to even more detailed forms 
of material equality and restitution. The process of holding the states-system together, and 
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holding it accountable, since the end of WWI has focused on building institutions to mitigate 
the exception of mobility after war, or building peace agreements that created settled states 
and regions. International law and related international institutions have played a role in 
building a remarkably static international architecture that has retained a primary respect for 
state sovereignty, just as IR theory has- in its mainstream at least- drawn heavily on the so-
called domestic analogy, decisively shaped by Eurocentric and northern bias notions of the 
state and international. 
From a review of the literature, and involvement in a series of peace and conflict studies 
research projects over the past decade, we have identified five areas of immobility that 
characterise top-down, and often state-centric, ways of making and maintaining peace – or 
more precisely, order. These immobilities illustrate an essential conservatism that struggles to 
keep pace with mobilities as manifested through popular movements, migration, and 
transnationalism.  
These five immobilities are: 
1. the infrastructure of peacemaking,  
2. an inability to think beyond fixed boundaries and state sovereignty,  
3. a belief in the primacy of geo-strategic and geo-economic order and hierarchy under 
the current terms of global governance,  
4. support for critically dysfunctional but relatively orderly regimes,  
5. and an inability to deal consistently with the free mobility of ideas, capital and people, 
especially with new technological developments.  
To deal with the first of these immobilities, it can be argued that the infrastructure of 
peacemaking has undergone immense change in recent decades with an increase in the 
number of NGOs and INGOs, the enhanced role for civil society, the creation of the 
Peacebuilding Commission, the New Deal for Fragile States, and the creation of peace-
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related units in many foreign ministries. Some of these approaches tend to represent 
epistemic positions that require mobility across different networks. Yet the UN, NATO, 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, all key players in contemporary peacebuilding 
and peacemaking, date from WWII and its immediate aftermath, and are dominated by 
rationalities associate with state-centricism and sovereignty. Control and the nature of these 
organisations has barely changed since their foundation. Although there are more 
peacebuilding actors than in 1945, the motive force (funding, power of initiative, conferral of 
legitimacy) behind many programmes and projects comes from a relatively small group of 
established actors. Key aspects of liberal peacemaking (mediating and building a certain type 
of territorial sovereignty and the central institutions of the state) are maintained precisely to 
prevent change and mobility. See, for example, how the issue of migration has dominated EU 
summits in recent years and how many member states have worked hard to erect and 
maintain ‘Fortress Europe’ (Malik 2018; Herszenhorn, Barigazzi and de la Baume 2018). 
Historically, this approach to state-craft has been appended to the nineteenth century states-
system, the colonial system, as well as the post-war 1945 liberal order, amplified through the 
post-Cold War settlement as determined by multilateral organisations and IFIs. This 
represents a fixed sovereign order, in which transactions and motion occur only under the 
rules of the dense networks of global governance and neoliberal capital, underpinned by the 
territorial state. The latter contradicts much of the progressive agenda of the architecture of 
UN peacebuilding, though the state is also necessary to provide security and public goods. 
Neoliberal capital has made the response to conflict even more difficult, however, because it 
underlines very different positions on who and what may be mobile in the current order. 
The second aspect of immobility that characterises the liberal peace order relates to an 
inability to think beyond fixed boundaries and state sovereignty for citizens (see the critical 
geopolitics literature on this: Agnew 2003; Elden 2013). The reduction of peacebuilding into 
 11 
state-focused activities has been well-covered elsewhere (Haider 2014; OECD 2011). The 
state, as something to be defended, fixed, reconstructed, right-sized, mentored, and inculcated 
into good governance techniques, has been the locus of much activity that falls under the 
headings of peace, stabilisation, reconstruction and development. Lurking beneath this line of 
thought is the Hobbesian notion that the state is a necessary evil, often formed through the 
forces of violence and maintaining at best a very fragile balance. Non-state dispensations are 
treated with suspicion (for example, Gaza, Somaliland, Puntland), or are regarded as staging 
posts towards eventual statehood (for example, the trusteeship that led to Kosovan 
independence, or the much delayed Palestinian statehood). 
Military security, the primacy of law, and the remaking of states and institutions have been at 
the core of post-Cold War peacebuilding. This has largely been within the framework of the 
liberal peace, and more recently the neoliberal peace/ state framework of global governance 
and capital. There has been a deep inability to escape from the territorialised nature of the 
state and its centralised institutions, or the inflexibility of the great power asymmetry that the 
states-system lends to the UN through the Security Council. These state-level certainties have 
been reinforced by regional architectures and widespread agreement on the roles, practices, 
and limits of international norms and organisations. Alongside this emphasis on 
institutionalism, the liberal peace (and many previous versions of peacebuilding) have relied 
on static notions of identity and related political dynamics and institutions – that retain 
singular identities (for example, Hutu, Tutsi, Croatian) (Campbell 1998). Only in some 
circumstances is it accepted that individuals can have multiple identities (for example, post-
Belfast Agreement Northern Ireland where inhabitants can self identify, and be recognised, as 
both Irish and British) (NIO 1998).    
An emphasis on political settlements, peace accords and new constitutions within the existing 
states-system and multi-lateral architecture bring the advantages of certainty and simplicity, 
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but they also suggest a finality – that the conflict is settled through centralised and 
territorialised state governance and boundaries, or that the peace once constituted is to be 
obeyed (with a Leviathan lurking somewhere behind it). The worldview behind this approach 
to peacemaking and peacebuilding is to see conflict as an aberration that can, and must be, 
‘fixed’ so that the system can be returned to a territorial and static equilibrium. 
Much liberal peacemaking and peacebuilding is made on the Euro-centric assumption that the 
international system operates on a core-periphery basis, with the static ‘local’ being seen in 
relation to a civilised, developed and orderly core - which can also be highly mobile - as 
represented by selected Atlanticist states and related international organisations (Sabaratnum 
2014). However, the periphery, once it has decided that neither the state nor the international 
will ‘rescue’ it from violence (structural or direct), may well have to decide that mobility 
provides a route to, and constitutes, emancipation and social justice. This is especially so 
under the more recent conditions of neoliberal statebuilding, where the primary interest of 
intervention lies in stabilization, counter-insurgency and marketization, meaning that states 
have little interest in supporting a cohesive and just society. Mobility is a challenge to the 
fixed ontology of the ‘international system’ creating a kind of positionality arbitrage across 
networks, scale and hierarchies, though such mobility also seeks eventually to return to a less 
mobile and more secure form of state, in the broader sense of human security (Gasper 2005; 
Odutayo 2016). Migration, formal or informal, is a route to peace and order in the absence of 
security and a viable state. 
Indeed, the modern albeit neoliberal state and the liberal international architecture, along with 
non-liberal states, are now obstacles to agential, mobile and networked, emancipatory forms 
of peace. This dynamic is based simply on exit rather than voice (Hirschman 1970), and re-
establishment in an advanced state and economy. They point to an imaginary of a fixed 
international architecture in which peace and development spreads to all states, rather than 
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what is now more likely: people exercising a kind of ‘peace arbitrage’ in which they seek to 
move up the rankings of security and order, as suggested by the hierarchical map of the 
UNDP Human Development Index. The latter indicates that peace is now mobile and 
networked (a mobile peace) rather than fixed by agreements between states, state 
constitutions, or international institutions (a sovereign peace, perhaps as a basis for the liberal 
peace).  
Somewhat ironically, many of the mobilities that we highlight in this article are the 
(sometimes unintended) consequences of liberalism and neoliberalism. Liberal 
internationalism, human rights, and the authoritarian capitalism that characterises many of the 
structures and operating procedures of official international relations has facilitated a 
weakening of traditional diplomacy, the production of hollow neoliberal states, constraining 
multilateralism (Richmond 2008). Human rights and democracy promotion has encouraged 
self-awareness and increasing rights claims from the bottom up. Promoting the ‘resilient 
subject’ may have had the unintended consequence of sending out the message that the state 
holds few answers and that people should be self-reliant, which they exercise across a range 
of networks and mobilities, not least global civil society. 
The third area of immobility central to the liberal peace is a belief in, or at least subservience 
to, the primacy of geo-strategic order and hierarchy, despite its rights framework. This is 
most visible in the lack of serious measures to investigate an updating of the self-declared 
mandate that awards power to the permanent five members of the UN Security Council. 
While there is plenty of evidence of multilateralism at the agency and General Assembly 
level, it is ultimately restrained by those capable of unilateralism or unwilling to enable a 
Security Council consensus (Binder and Heupel 2015). It often tends to operate across state-
centric levels, rather than reaching and representing global societies’ many claims more 
directly. This great power and single nation exceptionalism is most visible in the case of the 
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United States with its derogation from the International Criminal Court, massive defence 
spending, defence of the dollar as the effective global gold standard, and private initiatives 
turned into policy like the Project for a New American Century. Yet other leading states, 
including the UK, Germany4, France, Russia and China, have all engaged in unilateralism in 
defence of order, and to symbolically assert their position in the global pecking order. 
Multilateralism has in some sense become a defence against multi-verticalism, representing 
the emancipatory claims made by populations- or subalterns- from below, against implacable 
state level interests. 
A fourth immobility central to the liberal peace is support for clearly dysfunctional but 
orderly regimes. Regimes, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt and many others, 
indubitably offend the advertised minimum standards of the liberal peace in relation to 
human rights, democracy and violence against their own citizens or those living within their 
own boundaries. Yet these offences are tolerated, and sometimes actively supported, as these 
states occupy geo-strategic and economic roles, particularly in relation to regional order. 
Immobility is reinforced by the long-standing nature of the support for these regimes. To a 
certain extent, China can be included in the list of regimes that are supported because of their 
bias towards the existing territorial and political order (with some regional exceptions of 
course). China  is showing signs of economic and military assertiveness (Liao and McDowell 
2016) yet is also a force for a multilateral form of global order modified by capital and state 
sovereignty. There is a strong mutual dependence between China and leading western states. 
The former looks west for investment opportunities, while the latter actively solicits these 
cash injections. Both have a mutual interest in stability.  
The final area of immobility relates to the inability of many of the institutions, personnel and 
principles of the liberal order to deal consistently with the free mobility of ideas, capital and 
                                                 
4 In the case of Germany it has been economic unilateralism. 
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people. This is perhaps best illustrated by the European migrant ‘crisis’ in which most states 
have proven unable and unwilling to comprehend, and cope with, the flow of people from 
war-affected and under-developed regions. States have been reactive rather than proactive, 
and have fallen back onto traditional means of policing migration: fences, border checks, 
calling in the military, and increased surveillance (Malik 2018). British Prime Minister David 
Cameron’s 2015 visit to a refugee camp in Lebanon illustrated a certain immobility in policy 
thinking. While expressing regret for the plight of Syrian refugees, a core message from his 
visit was to discourage people from travelling to Britain (Watt 2016).  
The chief aim of this section has been to illustrate that the principal aim of key players in the 
in the international system is to continue their position as guardians of a static hierarchy and 
territorial order. Discourse analysis of speeches by advocates of liberal internationalism 
illustrate the extent to which peace and justice is trumped by the static characteristics of this 
order, connected to centralised governance, territorialism, nationalism, and borders. Indeed, a 
statistical analysis of post-Cold War comprehensive peace accords shows that these accords 
emphasise territorialised notions of security rather than networked and relational 
understandings of rights or indeed sovereignty (Slaughter, 2004: Qin, 2018; Moyn, 2018) in 
their provisions and the implementation of these provisions (Lee, Mac Ginty and Joshi 2016). 
In the next section we argue that the notion of internationally-supported peace based on order 
is in contrast with bottom-up and networked agentialism, which is derived from mobility, 
relationality and a challenging of the fixity of material, epistemic, and social boundaries, as 
well as the realisation of more material forms of equality in a global context. This is most 
visibly illustrated by the migrant ‘crisis’ sparked by wars in Syria, Afghanistan and 
elsewhere, but also by a range of other factors. Mobility appears to be linked to global justice, 
in other words (Carney, 2006). 
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It is worth reiterating the caveat that we do not see a strict binary between the immobile top-
down and the mobile bottom-up. Both categories contain mobility and immobility (for 
example, as with transnational capital and its operatives) and require or govern networks and 
relationality in some way, and we conceptualise them in line with works on hybridity that 
emphasise heterogeneity within groups and porous boundaries between them (Peterson 
2013). The formal states-system has seen a good deal of reinvention and shape-shifting in 
reaction to exigencies. The local level is not a sector of complete mobility – it contains links 
with traditionalism and territoriality. Indeed, the top-down sector has shown immense 
tolerance in relation to one form of mobility: capital. The free movement of capital, and 
statist responses to protecting this free movement in the midst of the 2007 credit crisis, 
illustrate the extent to which capital is exceptionalised. While the movement of people and 
many goods is restricted, controls on capital are much less stringent (OECD 2012). As 
Dierckx and others have argued, the free movement of capital remains a cornerstone of 
neoliberalism and can threaten state sovereignty (Dierckx 2016; Siddiqui and Armstrong 
2018). 
 
The Impact of Mobility on Peace, Security, and Order Frameworks 
A series of hyper-mobilities of capital, people, ideas and technology now challenge the fixed 
order as described above. There is some evidence that mobility and the political arbitrage 
upwards along the human development index may well be emerging as a new right 
articulated by the subaltern, along with the right to physically move to seek security, if not 
human security.  
In our analysis, the everyday actions of people in, and fleeing from, conflict-affected zones 
displays physical and perceptual mobilities that challenge traditional actors who have 
assumed responsibility for more static forms of peace, order and stabilisation. These static 
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responses maintain human populations in situ, and are often aimed at developing the 
architecture of a state, with centralised governance, security services subject to government, 
accountable to the law, and with a democratic and rights observing population. The 
international architecture, widening and deepening as it has over the same period was meant 
to provide checks and balances in the relations between states, as well as protect citizens from 
states. Notably omitted was the need to protect citizens from capital and globalisation, as 
these two factors were thought to be an important part of the emancipation of the citizen and 
the checks and balances of international order, promoting liberty and cooperation over 
centralised and unaccountable power. This all depends on a tiered international order, 
stratified in terms of capital and resources, which are in turn linked to mobility (and 
immobility). Ultimately, it makes sense that ‘labour’- in this case the conflict-affected citizen 
- would choose exit and mobility over voice in a collapsing state, given the poor track record 
of many peacebuilding and statebuilding interventions. The fixed international architecture’s 
response (or lack of response) to genocide, ethnic cleansing, corruption and civil and 
transnational war has made human mobility a rational option for many. 
 
As the current European migrant ‘crisis’ illustrates, individuals, families and substantial 
groups of people seek their own peace, emancipation, and social justice through migration, 
trading failed states for shadowland journeys, in order to re-establish themselves in a better 
environment even if they sacrifice possessions, status, identity, and rank along the way. 
Crucially, and as will be discussed below, these bottom-up mobilities cannot be seen in 
isolation and narrated simply as local agency, resistance or subversion. Instead, they operate 
in conjunction with top-down mobilities produced by the very states and international system 
that now feel threatened by the hypermobility of people, capital, weapons and disease. In 
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particular, the neo-liberal and nationalist stances of leading states and their financial 
architecture contributes to the co-constitution of these threats.  
Perhaps the most notable feature of state and international organisation responses to the 
European migrant crisis (and we are aware of terminological debates on whether ‘refugee’ or 
‘migrant’ are the most appropriate terms) (Kyriakides 2016; Rachman 2015) is the extent to 
which they entail a retrenchment of traditional bulwarks to the mobility of people, identities 
(and to a certain extent goods). Thus, for example, we have seen investments in walls and 
barriers (Rigby 2015; Feher 2016; Politi and Ghiglione 2016), the recruitment of more border 
security personnel (Thorpe 2016), and increased cross border cooperation to keep out 
migrants (UK Government 2016). There has been a very noticeable securitisation of the 
migrant issue, including a discursive securitisation whereby the movement of people is elided 
with the movement of drugs and weapons and thus cast as a multi-pronged threat (ibid). 
Traditional arms of the state have been deployed in state attempts to respond to the migration 
issue. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, proto-modern states relied on militaries, 
navies, militias, prisons, and deportation to establish a monopoly of violence over citizens, 
and to reinforce their legitimacy. As Tilly (1985: 175) noted, Europe’s sixteenth and 
seventeenth century rules used ‘two expensive but effective strategies’ in forging modern 
states: extending officialdom to the local level, and establishing police forces that were 
independent of both the military and local magnates. In the contemporary era, traditional 
actors and techniques have been mobilised to deal with migration. Even apparent innovations, 
such as the deployment of drones, tracking technologies and bio-metric data (Topak 2014), 
are aimed at rather traditional ends: verifying the identity of people, controlling their 
movement, and reinforcing and legitimising the power of the state. The verification of 
identities has struggled to move beyond fixed notions that individuals must ‘belong’ to a 
particular country, subject to its territorialised sovereignty (Wang 2004) and makes few 
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allowances for the fact that chosen identity and state-issued identity may not overlap 
(Adamson 2006). While many countries allow dual citizenship, many do not (including 
Austria, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and Norway) (Mirilovic 2014). Despite decades of 
refining intra-Union mobility legislation and practicalities, citizenship is granted by member 
states not by the EU itself.  
The chief point is that state and international organisation responses to the mass movement of 
people (and associated movements in identity) have drawn on a traditional pattern of denial 
of movement, identification of those moving, and repatriation of those deemed to have 
moved illegally (Salter 2004). This traditionalism has relevance for our interest in how peace 
is made, maintained and framed. It suggests that peace, as sponsored by leading states and 
international organisations, is based on notions and practices of static identities, identities that 
are documented, static boundaries, legitimate states and institutions and order. As the next 
section seeks to show, this top-down immobile version of peace stands in contrast to some 
bottom-up peace-focused developments. 
 
Everyday forms of peace as mobile  
This section endeavours to show how bottom-up, everyday activities in relation to peace  
show a fleetness of foot that states and international institutions seem incapable of, or 
actively block. It can be considered as a mobile form of peace. A substantial literature has 
emerged on ‘everyday peace’ or the ways in which individuals and communities navigate 
through division and insecurity using their own emotional intelligence and resources, and 
often independent of activities by states (Richmond, 2009: 580: Richmond, 2011b: 190; 
Berents 2015; Mac Ginty 2017). The focus of this article is on the everydayness of mobility 
and its implications for peace. This everyday agency is increasingly transnational (Brigden 
2016) and transversal, and aware of the relationality between the multiple factors that 
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contribute to war, peace, and opportunities for individual and collective progress. As the 
examples below will show, this everyday agency is often hidden and ingenious (Richmond 
2011). The most obvious example of the everyday mobile agency comes in the form of the 
movement of migrants from conflict-affected zones, and areas of limited economic 
development, to Europe and beyond. We can also see this everyday agency in establishment 
of local councils in Syria, a people’s peace process in the Basque Country or Colombia, the 
2014 protests across Bosnia, and countless actions of everyday peace and diplomacy at the 
community level in deeply divided societies (Odendaal, 2013: Millar 2016). Taken together, 
these can be conceptualised as forms of mobility through which individuals and collectives 
do not feel beholden to institutionalised and formal responses to conflict or economic 
hardship. In some cases, their everyday agency is a direct response to the rigidity of 
institutionalist responses or lack thereof. In other cases, it occurs in spaces unoccupied or 
vacated by institutions and states. Crucially, the forms of mobility discussed here are not 
merely the actions of people on the margins. They are occurring on a significant scale, and 
constitute an emergent, perhaps private and underground, worldview that is cognisant of the 
agency of individuals, the opportunities afforded by transnationalism and technology, and the 
limitations of states and formal institutions.  
In response to the immobilities in peace making and maintenance that we outlined at the 
beginning of this article, we see emergent everyday responses, which have global 
ramifications through transnational and transversal networks. These everyday responses are 
based upon critical forms of agency, resistance, and hybridity, and often rely on a mobility of 
people, identities and power. Based on a wide review of literature, and on our involvement in 
a series of research projects (for example, the Everyday Peace Indicators project, the 
EUNPACK project looking at EU crisis response mechanisms, a British Academy project 
looking at legitimate political authority), an indicative list of everyday responses includes:  
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1. An everyday infrastructure of peacebuilding to compete or complement the formal 
institutional approach (Odendaal 2013: Surmond and Sharma 2014): 
2. A mobile and shifting archipelago of new rights claimants which challenge existing 
static conceptions of rights and citizens in the states-system; 
3. Networks of everyday but also transnational and transversal relationality that 
challenge geo-strategic and geo-economic order 
4. Tactical support for clearly dysfunctional but still relatively orderly regimes in that 
they offer a platform for future reform and expansion, following increasingly 
micropolitical/ infrapolitical processes and as a challenge to isolationalism, 
nationalism, and their fixed hierarchies of status and power 
5. The simultaneous exploitation of new opportunities for global contact and mobility to 
reflect the free mobility of ideas, capital and people, especially with new 
technological developments, and despite the static states-system. 
Everyday peace infrastructures are found in the on-the-ground activities and networks found 
in conflict and post-conflict zones whereby individuals and small groups make and maintain 
peace and engage in the tolerance and conciliation required for society to function. These 
infrastructures and networks are flexible and mobile, do not wield direct power, and often 
have local (and sometimes international) legitimacy. Their power often lies in critical and 
subtle forms of agency, and the depth and extensive nature of their networks. They eventually 
may connect the rural, the capital with multiple international organisations and actors. They 
represent, perhaps, in embryonic and archipelagic form, an emergent transnational order 
based upon a range of critical agencies (Sen 1999: Richmond, 2011), and one that the 
existing international peace architecture, which revolves around states, the UN, IFIs, and 
INGOs, needs to engage with.  
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Consider, for example, the Syrian local  established in those parts of Syria not controlled by 
the Assad regime or rebel or Islamist groups (Egeland 2015; Talmon 2013; Waters 2017). 
The councils are largely organic, local-level attempts to provide basic services in the absence 
of the state. The peace, security, and order carved out by the local councils is constituted 
through everyday acts of service of basic needs facilitated by a range of global connections in 
some instances: food, shelter, and sanitation, as well as information about risk and related 
tactics, and attempts to build minimalistic institutions connecting these to core values. 
Interestingly, and betraying the immobility of many traditional diplomatic and humanitarian 
actors, bilateral and international actors have sought to sponsor (and possibly co-opt) the 
local councils. At heart here is a crisis of access suffered by traditional state and international 
actors who cannot physically access the populations they wish to minister to. While not 
belittling the physical and security deterrents driving this crisis of access, these operate 
alongside a much broader list of factors that have created barriers between aid providers and 
bilateral donors on the one hand, and recipients on the other. The list includes the political 
economy and professionalization of the aid world, the possibilities (and limitations) of remote 
diplomatic and humanitarian programing, and the essential conservatism of diplomatic 
structures and protocols that were forged in the nineteenth century (Rieff 2002). Behind all of 
this are worldviews of hierarchies, binaries of donors and recipients, and concepts of 
legitimate actors. The Syrian local councils, and other initiatives in other conflict-affected 
communities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina, have taken a 
more prosaic approach (often through necessity) that is ready to accept resources from 
overseas actors but offers limited fealty in return. The rise of ‘resilience’ as a policy 
buzzword is, in part, a recognition by international actors that their resources and ability to 
effect change are limited as much as it represents yet another attempt to shift responsibility 
onto the shoulders of the weak (Mackinnon and Derickson 2013). 
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Further forms of everyday mobile peace comes in the form of shifting archipelagos of new 
rights claimants that are expanding our understanding of rights (Moyn 2018). They challenge 
fixed boundaries and state sovereignty and liberal institutionalism. This positive and hybrid 
form of mobile peace is reconstructing legitimacy to include more hybrid approaches to the 
mediation of political claims across time (historical justice) and space (distributive justice) 
(Richmond 2015). This new network of relationality (Qin 2016), which is increasingly 
focused upon global justice (including matters of history, equality, gender, and the 
environment) is transversal and transnational, cross-cultural and multi-scalar, and utilises the 
latest technologies of exchange, contact and transport. It is predicated on eventually replacing 
the primacy of the geo-strategic, geo-economic, territorialised order and hierarchy under the 
current terms of global governance. Mobile and everyday forms of peace are often tactically 
oriented towards critiquing but not necessarily removing power. Its flexibility means that it 
has the ability to subvert the free mobility of ideas, capital and people, especially with new 
technological developments, into new rights claims suitable for new, more hybrid forms of 
peacemaking.  
An immediate, everyday and mobile form of peace involves migration away from zones of 
conflict. This is a negative form of mobile peace. It is no accident that the leading refugee 
‘producing’ countries in 2016 were all war-affected: Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia and South 
Sudan (UNHCR 2017). A common trope among critics of refugees and migrants can be 
summed up as ‘why don’t they stay and fight for their own country?’ (Awford 2015). In this 
worldview, citizenship entails a duty to defend the sovereign and leaving one’s country in 
times of conflict is equated with dereliction, even cowardice. In another reading, the 
movement of military aged men (and families) away from a conflict zone is a pacific act, 
reducing the ability of political and military leaders to wage war. In relation to Syria, 
deserters from both Assad’s regime and the Free Syrian Army have been vocal in puncturing 
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official narratives of the righteousness of causes and strategies (Davison 2016). The 
appearance of so many Syrian, Afghan and Eritrean young males in Europe and elsewhere 
constitutes a rebuke to official narratives that equate, in a bio-political way, place of birth 
with service to the state. Throughout history, mobility has been essential for peacemaking, 
and after war ends it has remained so through return and reintegration (Annan, Brier and 
Aryemo 2009 and Alden 2002). Nevertheless, states have been keen to regulate such 
mobility. 
The fluidity of identities plays a key role in the emergent and mobile forms of peacemaking 
(Onorato and Turner 2004 and Beckhofer and Mccrone 2014). As we have seen, orthodox 
state-centric approaches to making peace rely on a series of immobilities including state 
boundaries and identities. An interesting counterpoint to this comes in the form of reports that 
migrants from states not affected by violent conflict claim that they are fleeing conflict-
affected states. The extent of this phenomenon is contested and politicised, but it constitutes a 
mobility of mind-set (as well as a physical mobility). It suggests that individuals are 
unpersuaded by the merits of fixed state-issued identities and international strategies based on 
the containment of the conflict and its population. The reportage of the phenomenon is also 
revealing about the ways conflicts and conflict-affected populations are framed. Thus, for 
example, British newspapers have accused migrants of claiming to be children from Syria 
when they are in fact adults from Pakistan (AFP 2015; O’Brien 2016). Such reporting seems 
premised on the notion of the ‘deserving’ refugee or migrant and unaware of on-going 
conflict in Pakistan. The identity-shifting nature of migrants draws on the repertoire of 
everyday peace skills including the use of emotional intelligence, dissembling, social 
categorisation, avoidance and ambiguity, and seems quite removed from strategies of 
containment and fixed identities that might be favoured by states (Mac Ginty 2014).  
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Another example of everyday peace based on fluid identities comes from fieldwork 
conducted as part of the Everyday Peace Indicators project by one of authors in northern 
Uganda (Mac Ginty and Firchow 2016). Many communities had been affected by the 
abduction of children by the Lord’s Resistance Army, and were now dealing with the 
reintegration of these youth back into community life. Much of the academic and policy 
literature on this subject exceptionalises the former combatants, setting them apart from the 
rest of the community because of their psychological trauma, indoctrination and violent 
skills. In a sense, much of the literature seemed stuck in the moment when the child soldiers 
were child soldiers and unable to conceive of the transient possibilities of individual identity. 
Individuals in these communities, however, took a more pragmatic stance. Focus group 
participants noted ‘you forgive because it was not their will to be abducted and made to 
participate in the war’ or ‘If possible they should be helped to start their life afresh’ (for 
details on the focus group processes, see everydaypeaceindicators.org). The overwhelming 
sentiment in the focus groups was one of sympathy towards the plight of formerly abducted 
persons and a recognition of the need to move on. This acceptance of fluid identities seemed 
to contrast with more static approaches. 
Mobile and everyday forms of peacemaking work across power differences and often outside 
of formal systems. Work on the pacific potential of diaspora communities has diasporas can 
mobilise and articulate in different ways to their ‘relations’ in the home territory (Cochrane, 
Baser & Swain 2009: 681-704). This pro-peace work may extend beyond a formal peace 
process where the state or polity is unable to provide the level of stability citizens require and 
they begin to move on, they produce hybridity on the move. For example, in the case of 
Cyprus it is well known that both Cypriot communities lived amicably side-by-side in 
London and Sydney after fleeing Cyprus during the violence between 1963-74. In these cases 
though, hybrid forms of peace were not produced in relation to the state of Cyprus, but 
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instead through their journey as refugees and their re-establishment in their new countries. As 
Adamson and Demetriou (2007: 507) make clear, everyday diasporic practices change over 
time. This type of situation also arises with other conflict-affected groups: the Bosnians, 
Kosovans, and Serbs in the US and Europe for example. Its hybrid aspect refers to the 
complex identity formulations that occur, but the mobile political agency is more a defence 
against the lack of structural change in the conflict environment and better options elsewhere 
where new priorities supplant old tensions. Under conditions of immutable structural conflict 
mobility helps subaltern agents scale material and geopolitical hierarchies. 
There are some signs of a new layer of the international system able to engage with critical 
and mobile forms of agency. UNHCR’s “blue spot” programme aims to provide mobile 
support in material and rights terms to populations on the move towards Europe, fleeing from 
war and violence, positioning meeting points able to provide support along the path of 
refugees and migrants (UNHCR 2016). This is a hint of the establishment of international 
organisations predicated on the right of citizens to shift their positionality in order to improve 
their security and prospects (which historically refugee policy and law has assumed). It 
requires a different type of thinking, one not predicated on territorial sovereignty and fixed 
states, institutions, and citizenship, but focused on the expanded rights of global, networked 
and mobile citizens (and not assuming that transnational actors tend to be male and rich). 
They are able to jump across scales rather than are constrained by territoriality. It expands the 
rationality of rights from the state-centric and normative to the globally practical and 
material, and it shifts the construction of peace and international organisation from that 
focused on static, bureaucratic, legal, and territorial institutions, to a free flowing and 
dynamic hybrid framework following and supporting the requirements of the global citizen in 
extremis. 
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Schemes like the Blue Spot hubs are an indication of the possibility that where states have 
failed, elements of the international community are assessing how to break through 
territorialised power structures creating humanitarian blockages in an of era of putatively 
global citizens. This is an indication of a post-liberal and hybrid development emerging from 
the issues raised by local, micro, and everyday, agencies, which raises structural and reform 
issues (Richmond, 2016). This is a global phenomenon that challenges entrenched and even 
moribund elites and systems but it is not revolutionary because it also recognizes their 
contribution to order. However, it is also an indication that such contradictions are creating 
increasing pressure on the liberal peace architecture and its ill-fitting neoliberal state 
components, something which is recognized in some parts of the international system but not 
others (Richmond 2014). Global governance has moved from states, law, institutions, and 
capital into a realm of other complex areas, from networks, to the environment, to the 
contradictions of rights, power, and capital, to mobile political agency, which require ethical 
responses to these contradictions (Sassen 2008). Bordering and centralization no longer work 
under these new conditions, where governance for peace, development, security and rights, 
needs to move with their subjects rather than to constrain them, as subjects try to trade up their 
positions in the world through arbitrage. Subjects are beginning to regard this as a right where 
their own institutions fail and no outsiders can help, pointing once again to matters of global 
justice constituted in historical and distributive terms. In the longer, anthropocenic and 
geological time range, this points to the need for global political order to be predicated on much 
broader understandings of equality and sustainability, rather than domestic rights and state 
hierarchy. In the absences of workable state, economic, and international peacebuilding, 
mobility of subjects is the only way to achieve this (Richmond, 2017). Alongside the actuality 
of mobile populations making new geographical and figurative space for themselves, there has 
also been innovative intellectual scoping of what new, post-territorial scenarios might look 
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like. Cohen and Van Hear’s (2017) notion of ‘refugia’, and the idea of a ‘Sesame Pass’, 
illustrate how the fixity of the sovereign states system might be retro-fitted to accommodate 
the transnational millions. Yet, most architecture has been planned for static systems of 
governance and populations, as one would expect in a system of territorial sovereignty. The 
acute mobility of informed modern populations means that such governance is always on the 
brink of failure.  
 
Conclusion 
The article can be read as an appraisal of the fitness for purpose of the Westphalian system 
and a set of practices, institutions and assumptions that rest on a peculiarly static worldview. 
As such, the article can be located in the on-going critique of liberal peacebuilding and 
neoliberal statebuilding (Richmond 2014), and attempts to scope – conceptually and 
theoretically – alternative approaches to peace and development. It can also be situated in 
wider debates within International Relations and other disciplines that seek to transcend 
statist and institutionalist analyses and take notice instead, of the local, the mobile, the 
transversal and the multi-scaled, pushing harder at the critical and post-structural project that 
began in the 1980s aimed at cementing cosmopolitanism and yet also moderating the 
certainties of liberalism or Marxism in the light of alterity and inequality. To understand 
emerging frameworks of mobility means jettisoning the epistemological and methodological 
baggage of the states-system and nationalism – a difficult task given the origins and inertia of 
academic disciplines such as International Relations. It also means re-assessing some long-
standing concepts (such as ‘diaspora’) that we rely on to describe mobile and transnational 
populations (Adamson and Demetriou 2007: 498). It is becoming increasingly clear that 
everyday dynamics have underlined the limits of liberalism and the need for structural 
change. Much local agency has bypassed the states-system and the liberal international 
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architecture in practical and ethical terms. Local agency and the everyday are very important, 
and often operate and manifest in unexpected ways.  
The dexterity of local agency means that some forms of mobility through global networks, 
formal, informal, and shadow connections are seeking out new forms of emancipation and 
global social justice. There is innovation, circumvention of orthodoxy and new articulations 
of peace and politics. This is an opportune moment to take stock of the potential of 
contemporary mobilities to help develop emancipatory forms of peace, given the limitations 
of state-based and international efforts.   
Mobilities and immobility relate to international and national governance, to the nature of 
order, and increasingly to peace. Controlling mobilities is the essence of governance and rent-
seeking, and achieving mobile political agency is a basis for emancipation in contemporary, 
networked and increasingly ‘digital’ times - given the limits of territorialised practices of 
intervention or local peacebuilding. The sheer scale of modern mobile political agency points 
to post-liberal forms of political subjectivity, to the formation of hybrid political 
communities, and the capacity of agents to shape their own peace through structural change 
in a way that governments and international organisations have not. This does not claim that 
the subaltern are immune to power relations, or that everyday life is unaffected by structural, 
direct, or governmental forms of power, but they are in fact part of them in the micro and 
capillary dynamic that Foucault outlined. In other words, the local co-constitutes the centre in 
often inchoate ways ( Foucault 1980, 96; see also Lilja & Vinthagen 2014). 
Peace settlements, responses to structural violence, inequality, poverty, and environmental 
degradation operate in a core-periphery environment of sovereign IR, and the most 
emancipatory step that an individual can take is to migrate away from violence, in the 
absence of state or international assistance. This involves a kind of political and personal 
arbitrage, traveling up the Human Development Index, in other words. Indeed this process 
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has been the case since at least the nineteenth Century (as today in Syria). In a very basic 
sense, this is ‘mobile peace’, or a form of conflict avoidance based on mobility. 
Global inequality and untreated direct and structural violence causes a ‘peace arbitrage’ 
within international relations, where the failure of local politics and economics, the state or 
the regional and international organisation leads to not voice but exit. Of course this journey 
creates other types of expediencies and other types of violence, and weakens the legitimacy 
and capacity for governance, of the core institutions that have maintained order since the 
1940s. This exercise of critical political subaltern agency, often through the shadowy and 
informal sectors of the global political economic is a consequence of the material inequality 
that currently undermines the legal equality of states, differences in national rights 
frameworks, the failure to address historical and distributive matters of justice (a painful 
example being the Palestinians), failure to reform the UN system, and the unsuitability of the 
modern states-system in addressing contemporary problems (such as in Syria or Libya) in a 
progressive, equitable, and fair manner.  
In the twenty-first century, relative emancipation and justice for the individual is found 
through scalar forms of mobility and networking by any plausible means- using capital and 
new technologies and often in defiance of sovereignty- over the bare life of remaining in situ 
and remaining subject to war, multiple forms of violence, underdevelopment, and failed 
development, peacebuilding, and statebuilding. This is both a poor indictment of the 
twentieth century liberal international order designed to bring peace and prosperity, the 
capacity of political and policymakers to respond to the tensions of modernity, and the ethics 
of our relations with others. Everyday mobility, through relationality, leading to a more 
networked peace and emancipation seem a sophisticated response by contrast. It is a mobile 
form of peace forged and embodied through everyday actions, often on the margins or in 
extremis. It is a form of peace that occurs in the absence of effective forms of peace offered 
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from more orthodox sources. This mobile peace should not be romanticised and is not 
immune from the injurious use of power. But it does involve innovation, subversion, 
resistance and the carving out of alternatives. It is produce by mobile political agency, which 
networks along relational connections, becoming focussing on expanded human rights and 
ultimately points to global justice as the emancipatory and sustainable philosophy of any 
peace process or of peacebuilding. As such, it deserves our attention. 
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